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THE RESURGENCE OF THE EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AS AN ANTITRUST PROBLEM
Rising to the surface as a problem in the restraint of trade fiel
under antitrust law is the method of wholesale and retail distribu
tion known as the exclusive territorial distributorship." The essen
tial characteristics of an exclusive territorial distributorship are
first, the setting of a limited area within which a retailer or wholesaler will confine his sales efforts; second, a covenant by the
manufacturer, or whoever may supply the seller, that the manufacturer will not sell to anyone else within that same area; and third,
an agreement that the manufacturer or supplier will exact similar
covenants from other wholesalers or retailers that they will also
confine their sales efforts to their allotted territories. Separation
of selling outlets in this manner is usually used by sellers of goods
sold under brand name where purchase is dependent upon brand
differentiation.2 One can readily see that spacial separation of sellers
eliminates competition in the price of each territorially distributed
brand to the extent that the areas allotted are large enough to discourage purchasers from traveling to sellers in adjacent selling
areas. On the other hand, the brand so handled is still in competition
with other brands and is, therefore, not completely free to command
a monopolistically high price. Hence, the problem becomes: do
territorial distributorships restrain competition or monopolize trade
in the type of goods concerned to the extent that they violate the
antitrust laws?
A distinction must be recognized between an exclusive territorial distributorship contract and an exclusive dealing contract.
Under the latter a retailer promises to deal exclusively in one manufacturer's goods. If exclusive dealing contracts are overly restrictive, they are subject to explicit prohibition under section 3 of the
Clayton Act,3 but there is no federal statute which deals expressly
with the territorial distributorship.4 The statutory provisions by
which the legality of the territorial distributorship would be measured would undoubtedly be either section 1 of the Sherman Act
prohibiting "every contract, combination .

. .,

or conspiracy, in

1. The exclusive territorial distributorship is also known as exclusive

representation and exclusive agency.
2. The exclusive territorial distributorship is sometimes used by those
who have gained control of a unique type of goods. See e.g., Morey v.Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 203 Pac. 760 (1922).
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914),. 15 U. S.C. § 14 (1952).
4. See Rifkdnd, Division of Territories,inVan Cise & Dunn, How to
Comply With the Antitrust Laws 127, 128 (1954).
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restraint of trade ... ," section 2 of the Sherman Act which makes
a misdemeanant of "every person who shall monopolize . . . or
combine or conspire with any other person . . . to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . .,", or

section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which declares
illegal all "unfair methods of competition," and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce . . ," Of these, section 1 of the
Sherman Act is the most likely to be used, since there is nothing
inherently monopolistic or deceptive about the exclusive agency.
When one reads into section 1 of the Sherman Act the rule of
reason announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,' the question posed, as it would apply to territorial distributorships is: does
an exclusive territorial distributorship unreasonably restrain competition ?
At present there is disagreement whether the exclusive agency
unduly restrains competition. The Federal Trade Commission has
procured several consent decrees requiring the abandonment of this
distributing systemY These decrees, however, must be considered
with a view not only toward the expense in defending such protracted litigation, but also toward the significance of the fact that
the entry of a consent judgment lessens the probability of suit by
private parties.10 Writers in the field have expressed their conviction that the exclusive territorial distributorship would probably
be declared illegal," but they have by no means been unopposed.
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti
trust Laws has declared that these distribution systems should b
allowed if they are created to serve valid business purposes and if
there is no attempt to monopolize the field.'12 Indeed, two recent
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
7. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).

8. 221U. S. 1, 60 (1911).

9. See. e.g., United States v. National Ice and Cold Storage Co.. 195.1
Trade Cas. 9167,660; United States v. Bearing Distributors Co., 1952-53
Trade Cas. 9167,595 (1953) ; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 1952-53
Trade Cas. 9167,510 (1953).
10. Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 15 U. S. C. § 1(
(1952) provides that consent judgments in criminal suits for antitrust violations are excepted from the usual rule that a decree against an antitrust
defendant will be prima facie evidence against him in subsequent civil action'
for treble damages brought by private parties. Since the private claimant
against one who has submitted to a consent judgment will have a more difficult task of proving the antitrust violation without aid of presumption, he
will be reluctant to bring suit in most cases.
11. See Rifkind, Divisioi of Territories, in Van Cise & Dunn, Hlow to
Comply With the Antitrust Laws 127, 131-36 (1954) ; Van Cise Understanding the Antitrust Laws, N. Y. Practicing Law Institute 81 (1955).
12. See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 27-29 (1955).
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federal district court cases on territorial distributorships have disclosed conflicting attitudes toward the validity of these selling
devices. 13 After the case treatment and various suggested analyses
of this problem have been studied, this Note will attempt to analyze
the legality of the territorial distributorship by examining its
tendency to restrain trade unreasonably by lessening competition in
the product market in which it operates.
COURT TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Early state cases which had occasion to test the validity of de
exclusive territorial distributorship under state law were almost
unanimous in granting their approval to the system. Some courts
strained the words of state statutes permitting the appointment of
a single distributing agent to mean that many individual sellers
operating exclusively in their territory were also allowed. 4 Others
resorted to a test of restraint of trade applicable to other types of
cases. Thus, it is generally recognized that the validity of a contract to refrain from competing in an area, as a covenant accompanying the sale of a business, is measured by the reasonableness of
the area within which the seller is prohibited from competing as
well as the extent of the prohibitions in the covenant in relation to
the protection necessary to the business sold.' " Some courts have
used these same criteria to find the exclusive territorial distribution
system valid, but they did not even consider the competitive state
of the market in which the goods were sold.' The few cases that
have examined economic policy in making their decisions show
consideration of the mutual advantages enjoyed by the retailersi1 or
the fact that exclusive agencies facilitate wider distribution of the
product to the maker's advantage and work no restraint of coinpetition.' s In one case the advantage to the manufacturer was said
to be one of the factors validating the device despite the recognition
that the territorial distributorship, as used by the particular mann13. Compare Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.. 138 F. Supp.
899 (D.Md. 1956), with Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co.,
135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955).
14. McConkey v. Smith, 112 Kan. 560, 211 Pac. 631 (1923); Zelner
Mercantile Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Plow Co., 98 Kan. 609, 159 Pac. 391
(1916).
15. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1641 (rev. ed. 1937).
16. See Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 (1864); Newell v.Meyendorff, 9
Mont. 254, 261, 23 Pac. 333, 334 (1890) (dictum).
17. Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N. E. 177
(192-5).
18. General Elec. Co. v. N. K. Ovalle. Inc., 21 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P.
1934), aff'd, 335 Pa. 439, 6 A. 2d 835 (1939).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

I %lol.40:853

facturer, allowed him a certain measure of control over the price to
the consumer,'" thus working some restraint to competition.
On the other hand, the Texas courts have always invalidated
exclusive territorial distributorships' - under the command of the
state antitrust statutes.2- 1 The only case outside of Texas that has
held the contract invalid arose in California in 1922. - -"In striking
down an exclusive sales agency over a three state area, the court
noted that the commodity involved had only one practical source
of supply, of which the contracting parties assumed they had control, and that the prime intent was to give the distributor monopoly
power over sales to consumers in his area. A later California case
upheld the device, distinguishing the adverse precedent on the
basis that there were in the later case both a competitive market
among the manufacturers of the product antd I lack of intent to
monopolize the whole market."' :
Although the earliest federal case concerning the exclusive territorial distributorship held it legal,'2 in time there developed some
opposition to this form of marketing as evidenced by untested jury
instructions intimating that a territorial distributorship would be
illegal if used as a means of eliminating price coml)etition between
dealers. 2 ' and by a dissent to a dismissal of an antitrust )rosecution
which expressed the opinion that the very division of territory by
one manufacturer was illegal in itself, since it eliminated conmpetition among distributors to such an extent that the distributor,
would be free to set any price they wished.' -6 In the most significant
federal case,' -7 nevertheless, the system was upheld. A new and
used car dealer brought an action against the manufacturers of
Chevrolet automobiles for restraint of trade in refusing the retail
dealer the privilege of setting up additional used car sales and repair
facilities outside the dealer's original zone of influence in down19.

Walter A. \Vood Mowing and Reaping Co. v. Greenwood I lard-

ware Co., 75 S. C. 378. 55 S. E. 973 (1906).
20.

See, e.g., Byrd v. Crazy Water Co.. 140 S. W.

2d 334 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1940) (alternative holding) ; Rogers v. Westinghouse Slec. Supply Co.
116 S. W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
21. Tex. Rev. Cie. Stat. art. 7426. § 7 (1951). For a discuissilo of the
territorial distributorship under Texas law see 6 Texas 1.. Rev. 210 (1928).
22. .Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727. 203 Pac. 760 (1922).
23. Great Western Distillery Products, Inc. v. John A. Wathen l)itillery Co., 10 Cal. 2d 442, 74 P. 2d 745 (1937).
24. Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co.. 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903).
25.

Lowe Motor Supplies Co. v. Weed Chain Tire Grip Co., 6 IFed.

Anti-Tr. Dec. 887. 902-03 (S.D. "N.Y. 1917).
1 T. C. 537 (1932).
26. General Cigar Co.. 16 F.
27. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 37 1F.Supp. 999 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 124 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir.). rhering denied. 130 F. 2d 196
(2d Cir. 1942). cert. denied. 317 U. S. 695 (1943).
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town Brooklyn. The district court dismissed the complaint on the
two bases that plaintiff had not shown that interstate commerce
was involved, and that in both the new and used car sales operations, Chevrolet allowed the dealer to use its trade mark, in return
for which Chevrolet had the right to protect its good will by restraining harmful competition among its dealers. The Court of
_Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's findings
and approved its reasoning.2 Upon a petition for rehearing the
Court of Appeals interpreted the contract to mean that the dealer
could compete beyond the bounds of his zone of influence, but
could not create additional facilities outside. In addition the court
found that there was ample evidence of competition in the low cost
class of automobiles. 9
Since this case in 1942, several cases dealing with exclusive
territorial distributorships have culminated in consent decrees. -0
In evaluating the significance of these decrees one must take account of the fact that all of these cases were brought against leading
producers in their field and were coupled with an alleged attempt
to monopolize or fix resale prices illegally.!" Two recent cases have
approached the problem of exclusive agency with divergent views.
In the first case Packard Automobile Company had been induced
by one of its distributors in Baltimore to deny further franchising
to the two other Packard distributors in that city so that the first
distributor might operate at a profit. In the treble damage action by
one of the disfranchised dealers, the jury was left with the question, whether Packard's actions at the request of the remaining
distributor amounted to an unreasonable agreement in restraint of
trade. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him damages.
On a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial, Judge Holtzoff of the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the jury had sufficient evidence
upon which to decide that the agreement between the manufacturer
and remaining dealer was an unreasonable restraint of trade, since
it diminished competition in servicing and selling of Packard automobiles.3 2 Although judge Holtzoff said that Packard would normally have the right to choose the number of dealers it wished to
28.

1942).

Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir.

29. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 130 F. 2d 196 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied. 317 U. S. 695 (1943).
30. See note 9 supra.

31. See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study

the Antitrust Laws 29 (1955).
32. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4
(D.D.C. 1955).
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maintain, it could not reduce the number of dealers by conspiracy
with another party. 3
A similar action was brought against the Hudson Sales Corporation in the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland.
The disfranchised dealers complained that Hudson had cancelled
their dealership contracts at the instance of the third Hudson dealer in metropolitan Baltimore, so that the only competition left caie
from two suburban Hudson dealers. Plaintiffs alleged and the court
admitted that the one dealer remaining in the city had a virtial
monopoly over the sale of Hudsons in the city of Baltimore. Plaintiffs further alleged a large drop in the sale of Hudson automobiles
in Baltimore as a result of the cancellation of their dealerships, and
they sought damages suffered from Hudson's actions. Judge Thonsen dismissed the complaints on the ground that they failed to show
an unreasonable restraint of trade. 4 It was held that though Hudson left the last dealer with a virtual monopoly in Hudsons, this
was insufficient to show a restraint of trade, since there was still
competition with other makes of automobiles. In addition, even
though there was a significant drop in the sale of Hudsons, this
was not enough to show a substantial restraint of trade, since
Hudson's share of the market was not large enough to affect the
market as a whole. The court criticized the Packard case for its
failure to hold that in order for a contract to eliminate competitors
to be illegal, it must be between competitors at the same stage of
production, or it must be made by a dominant producer. The court
also found fault with the Packard case because it drew a distinction
between a manufacturer's decision to eliminate dealers subsequent to
negotiations with other dealers and that same decision made without
discussion. The court decided that that distinction was specious,
since all such decisions are made only after full discussion of the
matter with the various parties to be affected. This distinction,
judge Thomsen felt, would make it virtually impossible for Iludson to cut down its number of dealers.35 Although this latter criticism seems valid, Judge Holtzoff's decision in the Packard case is
probably sounder in its conclusion that elimination of all dealers
in one make of automobile can be a substantial restraint of trade.
When a customer's choice has narrowed down to one type of car.
the only protection he has against monopoly power at the retail level
is the competition between dealers in that automobile not only over
33. Id. at 8.
34. Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.. 138 F. Supp. 89)0
Md. 1956).
35. Id. at 906.

1)

1956]

NOTES

prices but also over the amount of free services offered, the length
of warranty on parts, and similar by-product features.
A recent comment on the validity of the territorial distributorship has expressed the opinion that illegality may be found in the
very division of territory insofar as it promotes price-fixing,3 which
is illegal per se27 As a cornerstone for the division of territory
analysis, the commentator points to the case of Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States"s which held that the geographical division of the market into individually controlled segments by a number of leading producers of cast iron pipe violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The commentator also points out,3 9 however, that
the Addyston case involved many manufacturers who together
produced two thirds of the pipe sold in the United States and controlled three fourths of the total market area. When a single manufacturer allocates territory among his dealers, price-fixing does not
result automatically as it does in situations where, as in the Addyston case, the majority of producers conspire together to eliminate
competition by dividing territory. The territorial distributorship is,
of course, illegal when used with an organized price-fixing system,
even though only a single producer uses this marketing device, for
a producer has no right to control the price of his goods after he has
once sold them.4 0 In order, however, to condemn the territorial distributorship as a price-fixing scheme without a finding of a separate price-fixing agreement, it is necessary to establish that selling
to but one dealer in each of several districts necessarily leads to a
means of fixing prices. A manufacturer who separates his retailers
need not set a minimum resale price in order to avoid ruinous price
competition in his brand of goods. His dealers may price the
commodity in its best competitive position in relation to rival products. The extent to which the producer will be able to set his price
in relation to all competing goods by isolating his sellers will depend
on the number of substitute products and the competitive nature of
the market in which he is selling. Except to the extent that a dealer
is relieved of price competition from other dealers in the same
brand of goods, it cannot be decided whether price-fixing necessarily results from use of the territorial distributorship, until the
product market in which the goods are sold has been studied.
36. See Riftdnd, Division of Territories, in Van Cise & Dunn, How to
Comply With the Antitrust Laws 131-36 (1954).
37. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
38. 175 U. S. 211 (1899).

39. See Riflind, Division of Territories, in Van Cise & Dunn, How to

Comply With. the Antitrust Laws 131-32 (1954).
40. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States. 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
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The exclusive agency may also be attacked on the ground that
it involves the same price maintenance vices promoted by refusals
to sell. 41 The courts have invalidated distribution systems containing refusals to sell either when the system incorporates a method of
enforcing fixed prices4 "' or when tile refusal to sell is the result of a

conspiracy. 43 It has been argued above that the exclusive agency
does not necessarily lead to price-fixing, and the opinion was also
expressed that the manufacturer should be able to consult his distributors when deciding what number of outlets he will maintain.
Therefore it seems that a refusal-to-sell attack is inapplicable to the
exclusive territorial distributorship.
SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

The approach to the territorial distributorship problen which
will probably prove most useful is suggested in the 1955 Report of
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. There it was stated that as an ancillary agreement in
the distribution of goods, and where it is not a part of an attempt
to monopolize or restrain trade by itself, the territorial distributorship should be held valid, if it serves lawful business purposes and
if it does not foreclose competition from the dealer's market. 44 The

essential element in preventing restraint of trade and one of the
prime reasons for the passage of the antitrust legislation is the
4
fostering of price competition as a mechanism of price making. t,
If the manufacturers have an unqualified right in choosing their
dealers, the pertinent consideration is whether enforced non-competition between dealers in one brand of goods is working a substantial prejudice to price competition in the relevant product
market. The answer to this problem depends first on a determination of the market in which the producer is operating and second on
the degree of competitiveness within that market.
In making a proper delimitation of the market, " one must first
determine the criteria for deciding which products are of a like
nature. The prime limitations have been expressed in terms of func41. See Comment, 58 Yale L. J. 1121, 1123, 1129-32 (1949).
42. Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441
(1922).
43.

See Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F.

Supp. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1955).

44. See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 27-29 (1955).
45. See Mund, Government and Business 87 (2d ed. 1955).
46. The scope of this Note does not include a ease analysis on the
question of determining the market. For a good discussion on this point, see
Macdonald, Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under' the Sherman
Act. 53 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (1954).
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tional interchangeability and reactive interchangeability.- In order
for product A to be functionally interchangeable with product B
it must be adaptable to substantially all the uses of product B, with
the same basic range of uses for both 5s For example, rubber fabrications may be substituted in many places normally calling for
plastics, but rubber is not subject to many of the diverse uses of
which plastic is capable and therefore is not functionally interchangeable with plastic. Further, if product A can accomplish only
generally what product B can do, e.g., radio as contrasted to the
newspaper, it is functionally non-interchangeable with product B,
but this is of course a matter of degree.4 9 If it is determined that
various products are functionally interchangeable, a second test,
that of reactive interchangeability, must be applied in order to
determine whether there are close substitutes within a market. This
concept measures the willingness of consumers to switch from one
brand to another in products which are functionally similar. Such
factors as design, quality, packaging, advertising, and sales promotion sometimes separate seemingly competitive products."0 Under this differentiation the recording of a composition of music by
a renowned performer or even by a quality recording company could
put the record in a market apart from recordings of the same musical composition by performers of negligible renown or by minor
record companies whose quality of recording is unknown. The
measure of reactive and functional interchangeability has been stated
in terms of cross-elasticity of demand. This means that if all other
factors are held constant, lowering the price or raising the quality
of one product will lower the demand for competing goods.5'
If, upon studying the character of the market, one finds that
there is little cross-elasticity of demand, that is, very few close substitutes from which a product is receiving effective competition.
the further elimination of competition through territorial distributorships should not be permitted. An example of such a market is
that of the automobile. All cars are functionally interchangeable,
but they have little reactive interchangeability because of extensive
advertising, the buyer's habit of purchasing one line of cars through
the years, the dealer's habit of giving higher trade-in allowances on
used cars of the same make as the new car to be purchased, and
47.

See Note, 54 Colun. L. Rev. 580, 586-92 (1954).

48. See id. at 586-88.
49. See ibid.

50. See Bain, Pricing, Distribution, and Employment 24 (rev. ed.
1953).
51. See Scitovskv. Welfare and Competition 396 (1951) - Bain. op. cit.
supra note 50, at 50-51: Macdonald, supra note 46, at 82-83.
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other similar factors. In the final analysis most competition to
individual buyers comes not from dealers in different makes of cars,
but from different dealers in the same make. If a purchaser decides
to buy one of the low- or even medium-priced cars of the big
three producers, the chances are good that there is some competition from numerous dealers in that make of car who are within a
reachable vicinity. If, however, the car chosen be one from a manufacturer other than the big three, the sources of competition in price
are very likely to be severely limited. Indeed, the Packard case"
pointed out that the elimination of rival Packard dealers could
cause the market for Packard automobiles to suffer a substantial
diminution in competition over trade-in values, terms of sale, and
efficiency of service. Thus the court recognized that reactive interchangeability was limited to the one brand of automobile and that
elimination of Packard dealers in the area lessened competition over
the price of Packards.
CONCLUSION

The exclusive territorial distributorship has a large hurdle to
overcome before it should be permitted. Because it casts out one
source of price competition, that between tle dealers in the brand
of goods concerned, it has been suggested that the exclusive agency
be prohibited altogether. The cases from both state and federal
courts show that there is no great tendency to strike down this
method of distribution, unless it works a monopoly or tends to restrain trade in a particular type of goods. Under the recently developing standards of competition and market, the territorial distributorship should meet two basic requirements. There must first
be a fairly large number of both functional and reactive interchangeables from which the product concerned can receive price
competition. Secondly the market must be characterized by lack of
collusion and independence of pricing and selling policies. If, but
only if, these two conditions exist, there should be ample safety in
allowing a manufacturer to choose the exclusive territorial distributorship as his means of distribution.
52. Webster 'Motor Car Co. v. Packard 'Motor Car Co., 135 F"..qpl4.9 (D.D.C. 1955).

